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THE ROLE OF THE ONCE-CONFIDENTIAL
INDUSTRY DOCUMENTSt
Roberta B. Walburntt
I want to start out by saying what a privilege it has been for our
team at Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi to represent both the State
of Minnesota and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota in this
case. It has been a particular privilege, given the principled stand
that the state and Blue Cross, as evidenced here today by Skip1 and
Andy,2 have taken at times when it was very much "the road less
traveled" nationally.
In 1994, when we filed suit we knew that the tobacco industry
had been in litigation for fifty years and never lost a single case. We
also believed that one of the keys to the tobacco industry's success
over the years had been their success in hiding and not producing
their internal documents.
Litigation against the tobacco industry started in the 1950s,
when the first epidemiological studies linking smoking and lung
cancer were published. In 1954, the first lawsuit was filed. In the
1950s, virtually no internal tobacco industry documents were pro-
duced. The same was true in the 1960s and the 1970s. In the
1980s, a personal injury lawsuit was filed in NewJersey, the Cipollone
t This essay is based on a speech Roberta B. Walburn gave at William
Mitchell College of Law's Center for Health Law & Policy symposium titled, "To-
bacco Regulation: The Convergence of Law, Medicine & Public Health."
tt Of-counsel at Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, L.L.P. Her practice has fo-
cussed on complex litigation, including products liability and intellectual property
cases. She was plaintiffs' liaison co-counsel in State of Minnesota & Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Minnesota v. Philip Morris Inc., et al. Prior to joining Robins, Kaplan,
Miller & Ciresi, she served as a law clerk to U.S. District Court Judge Miles W.
Lord. She graduated with a B.A. from the University of Michigan and received her
J.D. from the University of Minnesota Law School.
1. See Hubert H. "Skip" Humphrey, III, The Decision to Reject the June, 1997
National Settlement Proposal and Proceed to Trial 25 WM. MrrcHELL L. REV. 397
(1999).
2. See Andrew P. Czajkowski, The Making of a Lawsuit: A Health Plan Perspec-
tive, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 379 (1999).
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action.3 Documents were produced in that case, and it was really
the first glimpse into the internal workings of the tobacco industry.
Between the Cipollone case and other personal injury cases in
the 1980s, about 1,700,000 pages of documents were produced.
Then came 1994 and the Merrill Williams documents that you
heard Peter Pringle talk about.* These were sensational docu-
ments. In numbers, they amounted to about 4,000 pages. Back in
1994 when we were starting out, many lawyers around the country,
including some of the colorful characters that Peter Pringle de-
scribed, were saying that no more document discovery was neces-
sary. But our instincts told us that the documents that were in the
public domain in 1994 were only the tip of the iceberg and that the
best documents were still hidden in the tobacco companies' files
and with the tobacco companies' lawyers.
The Minnesota document production netted about thirty-five
million pages of documents in four years of litigation. Many mil-
lions of them were written in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, hidden in
tobacco company files for decades, but never produced despite the
ongoing litigation.
Now, you might ask, how do you review thirty-five million
pages of documents? We did it the only way we knew how, which
was one page at a time, using a phenomenal team of senior lawyers
from our firm. The tobacco companies delayed producing the
documents as long as possible. When the trucks started rolling in
to the Minneapolis depository, there were times when so many
documents were piling up in the depository that, I don't know if
you remember that old "I Love Lucy" show where Lucy and Ethel
are working on the assembly line, boxing, I think it was chocolates,
and the line starts going faster and faster ... well, that's how we
felt. Further, the only way to charitably describe a lot of the docu-
ments that were produced would be "pure junk." For example, we
were given thousands and thousand of pages that we had to wade
3. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988).
4. See Peter Pringle, The Chronicles of Tobacco: An Account of the Forces that
Brought the Tobacco Industry to the Negotiating Table, 25 WM. MrrcHELL L. REV. 387
(1999).
5. See id. at 388-91.
6. See State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. July 14, 1995). The order mandated the establishment of a depository
within thirty miles of the Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport "for timely
and efficient control and management of discovery in this action. All documents
produced by any party to this action shall be deposited therein." Id. at 2.
[Vol. 25
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through on tobacco beetles-the insect variety.
But mixed in among those papers we would find some gems,
like the handwritten document by Thomas Osdene, a senior re-
search official at Philip Morris.7 When he testified in pre-trial dis-
covery in our case about this document and others, he pleaded the
Fifth Amendment. The first line of the document says, "[IS]hip all
documents to Cologne ... ." Cologne, Germany is where Philip
Morris maintains a research facility called Institute fuer Biologische
Forschung ("INBIFO"). The work done there is, in large part, for
the United States' operations. By doing the work in Cologne, the
industry was able to keep the documents offshore. Line number
two says, "[K]eep in Cologne."9 Line number three says, "OK to
phone and telex," and then in parenthesis, "these will be de-
stroyed."'1 Line number six says, "[I]f important letters or docu-
ments have to be sent please send to home - I will act on them and
destroy."1
In the end, we copied about one to two percent of the docu-
ments that were sent to the Minneapolis depository. There is a12
second depository in Guilford, England, where the BAT group of
companies produced their documents. The collection we copied
became known around the country as the "Minnesota Select" set of
documents. Literally every other state in litigation-including Mis-
sissippi, Florida and Texas, which have settled their state actions-
now have the "Minnesota Select" set to assist in pursuing their ac-
tions.
The depository is now open to the public," and it is being
used, not just by other litigants, but also by researchers, public
health professionals, and tobacco control professionals. We copied
the one to two percent with a very precise purpose in mind and
that was to use the documents for trial exhibits. But there is a
7. See PM 1000130803. Documents in the depository are identified by Bates




11. Id. (emphasis in original).
12. The term BAT Group refers to the British entities that, over time, have
been either affiliates or the corporate parent of Brown & Williamson. These enti-
ties include B.A.T. Industries p.l.c. and/or British-American Tobacco Co., Ltd.
13. The depositories will remain open pursuant to the terms of the settle-
ment. See ConsentJudgment at 6, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 394336, at *3-*4 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 8, 1998).
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wealth of information in the depository that is untapped. 14 We wel-
come you all to visit it.
Getting the documents produced was a long, hard road, as you
might imagine. The tobacco companies objected to almost all of
our document requests. The tobacco company lawyers played end-
less word games with our requests. Here are some of the words that
we used in our document requests that the tobacco companies'
lawyers told us they just did not understand: "smoking and health";
"the properties and effects of nicotine"; "advertising, marketing or
promotion of cigarettes"; "document destruction policies"; "addic-
tive target levels of nicotine"; and "minimum levels or doses of
nicotine."
Those of you who are lawyers know that, unfortunately, word
games are often played in litigation these days. The tobacco com-
pany lawyers took this to new extremes. We would go to meet and
confer with the tobacco companies' lawyers, and they would show
up, filling the room with their lawyers. We were forced to bring
motion after motion to compel the production of the documents.
There were more than a dozen appeals including two to the United
States Supreme Court on discovery issues.
15
One of the issues to go to the U.S. Supreme Court was the
production of document indexes created by the tobacco compa-
nies' lawyers. 6 There was an extraordinary amount of data in these
indexes, and they proved to be invaluable in assisting us in target-
ing documents and breaking privilege. To give you an idea of just
how extensive these indexes were (and these were all prepared
long before our case started in 1994), R.J. Reynolds, just one com-
pany, eventually told us it had spent $90 billion creating its index."
We fought for sixteen months to get those indexes. It took eight
court orders just from the trial court, and unsuccessful appeals by
the industry to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court before the indexes were
14. See Michael Ravnitzky & Jeanne Weigum, Filtered or Unfiltered Information:
Choices in How to Make the Minnesota Tobacco Document Depository Records More Accessi-
ble to the Public, 25 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 715 (1999).
15. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. Humphrey, 517 U.S.
1222 (1996) (mem.); Philip Morris Inc. v. Minnesota ex rel. Humphrey, 118 S. Ct.
1384 (1998) (mem).
16. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 517 U.S. at 1222 (mem).
17. See Transcript of Proceedings at 45, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris
Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 12, 1995).
[Vol. 25
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turned over.18
Another pivotal discovery battle was a battle over documents
that the tobacco industry claimed were either attorney-client or
work-product privileged. From the beginning of the case, we be-
lieved that these would be the best documents. The tobacco com-
pany lawyers appeared to be immersed in the science of the indus-
try. Their attorneys appeared to be directing scientific research in
an effort to conceal that science by claiming that it was protected
by the attorney-client privilege. As the litigation progressed, we
knew we were on the right trail because we started finding docu-
ments showing the unusual involvement of lawyers at the tobacco
companies. One was a handwritten note, from 1978, that was
found in the files of senior officials at the Lorillard Tobacco Com-19
pany. It appears to be notes taken at a meeting of tobacco indus-
try officials. Paragraph number one says, "[W]e have again 'abdi-
cated' the scientific research directional management of the
industry to the 'lawyers' with virtually no involvement on the part of
scientific or business management side of the business." °
Another 1978 document was written by a senior official at the
Council for Tobacco Research (CTR), which was supposed to be
the research trade organization of the industry. In the first para-
graph, it says, "I think CTR should be renamed Council for Legally
Permitted Tobacco Research, CLIPT for short."2
The tobacco companies took the battle over privileged docu-
ments, as they did with the fight over indexes, to the U.S. Supreme
Court where they lost one more time. 2 In the end, and actually
very close to the end of our trial, about 40,000 privileged docu-
ments were produced. These documents were eventually produced
to us because the courts found that many of the documents were
not privileged in the first instance; for example, they were science,
23not legal advice. The courts also found that many documents
should be produced pursuant to what is known as the crime-fraud
18. See Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minne-
sota Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 477, 493 n.71 (1999) (detailing
the appeals and rulings by various courts regarding the document indexes).
19. See Lorillard 01346204.
20. Id. (emphasis in original).
21. CTRSF 0800031.
22. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Minnesota ex rel. Humphrey, 118 S. Ct. 1384
(1998) (mem).
23. See State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at
9 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 9, 1997).
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exception to privilege. If there is an ongoing crime or fraud, the
courts will strike claims of privilege for documents relating to that
crime or fraud.
One example of the type of documents we found in the privi-
leged documents, or so-called privileged documents, had the title,, • . ,,25
"Lung Cancer-Smoking Studies. It was written by Allen Rodg-
man, a scientist at RJR. The date of the document is September,
1955. The document was a compilation of various studies about
cancer and smoking. Among other things, this document re-
capped studies indicating that "[t] he increased frequency of lung
carcinomas in all civilised [sic] countries is thought to be con-
nected with the increased consumption of cigarettes which has
taken place .... It also cited studies indicating that "the risk of
developing cancer of the lung was approximately 50 times as great
among those smoking 25 or more cigarettes per day as nonsmok-
ers. 27 This document sat in the lawyer's files for forty years while
the industry continued to claim that it was not proven that smoking
caused lung cancer.
I have told you about just a few examples of the document
wars we fought literally every day of the litigation. When we got to
trial, and when the industry witnesses continued to testify along
their party line, for example, "smoking isn't addictive," we could
show internal documents where the tobacco industry scientists ad-
28
mitted that smoking was addictive. We could show internal
documents that pointed out why the industry publicly denied their
product was addictive. One such document is from the files of the
Tobacco Institute, the industry's public relations arm. In it, the
name Shook, Hardy & Bacon (which is one of the industry's main
national law firms) emerges: "Shook, Hardy reminds us, I'm told,
that the entire matter of addiction is the most potent weapon a
prosecuting attorney can have in a lung cancer/cigarette case. We
can't defend continued smoking as 'free choice' if the person was
'addicted'"
29
When industry witnesses testified at trial that nicotine is not a
drug, an argument that the industry is making today in a number
24. See id. at 28-31.
25. See RJR 502815280.
26. Id. at 289.
27. Id.
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of forums, including their effort to stave off FDA regulation, we
could show documents like the 1969 document written by William
Dunn, who was known at Philip Morris as the "nicotine kid." In it,
William Dunn says, "I would be more cautious in using the phar-
mic-medical model-do we really want to tout cigarette smoke as a
drug? It is, of course, but there are dangerous FDA implications to
having such conceptualization go beyond these walls."
30
At trial, when the industry witnesses testified that they did not
manipulate nicotine, we had a document from the files of R.J. Rey-
nolds detailing how RJR was reverse-engineering the Marlboro
cigarette to find out why Philip Morris was increasing sales so dra-
matically with its Marlboro brand.3 ' Reynolds concluded, in 1973,
that the reason was that Philip Morris had increased the pH level of
the cigarettes, which led to a higher percentage of free base nico-
tine in the cigarettes. The result was that Reynolds embarked on its
own research and development program to duplicate the Marlboro
cigarette.
When the industry witnesses testified at trial that it is not
proven that cigarettes cause lung cancer-and yes, they still take
that position in court'-we showed what the industry really be-
lieved dating back to the 1950s. A document called, "Report on
Visit to U.S.A. and Canada,"33 written by three British scientists who
came to the United States in 1958 and held a series of meetings
with virtually every tobacco company in the United States, summa-
30. PM 1003289921.
31. See RJR 500991002.
32. Even in 1998, Geoffrey C. Bible, chief executive officer of Philip Morris
Inc., testified in the Minnesota trial, as follows:
Q: Did you go to your fellow CEOs and say, "Let us join together and get
a blue ribbon panel of scientists to tell us does smoking cause disease?"
Did you do that?
A: No, I did not do that, because I really felt that everybody in the world
believes smoking causes disease.
Q: You don't; do you, sir?
A: I don't know.
Q: Do you know how many have died as a result of smoking?
A: How many people have died?
Q: Died.
A: I don't know if anybody has died. Ijust don't know, no.
Transcript of Proceedings at 5734-36, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 85584, at *17-*18 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 2, 1998).
33. See BAT 105408490.
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rized the view of the people they met. They reported that, with one
exception, H.S.N. Greene, the individuals with whom they met "be-
lieved that smoking causes lung cancer, if by 'causation' we mean
any chain of events which leads finally to lung cancer and which in-
volves smoking as an indispensable link."4 This document sat in
the industry's files for almost forty years. If this document and
thousands of others had been produced back in the 1950s when
the litigation was beginning, and the industry was winning cases
with its claim that smoking did not cause lung cancer, the history of
the tobacco litigation would have been rewritten over the past few
decades.
I want to leave you with one piece of testimony from the trial.
It is an example of how the documents were used at trial. The wit-
ness was Scott Appleton, who was a Brown and Williamson execu-
tive who flew into town to testify. Mike Ciresi was cross-examining
him with a document that described how Brown and Williamson
was planning to essentially launder scientific research through the
lawyers so that Brown and Williamson could claim privilege over
the documents and the research. After going through the docu-
ment at some length, Mike asked the witness, "Well sir, what's be-
ing proposed is a ruse because in the operational context there
wasn't going to be any attempt to distinguish what were and were
not litigation documents, correct?"' 5 The answer was, "Well I don't
know the term you are using, a 'ruse.' I don't know what that
means."36 Mike asked, 'You've never heard that?" The answer:
"No, I'm sorry. "37 Questioned again, 'You have never heard that?"
The answer (and this is one of those memorable moments from
trial) was, "Maybe it is a Minnesota term."8
We were sitting at counsel table saying to ourselves, "It's a ruse,
you betcha. Welcome to Minnesota."
34. Id. at 492.
35. Transcript of Proceedings, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 172993, at *30 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 2, 1998).
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